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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici curiae are constitutional law scholars who
possess an acute interest in a reasoned development of
constitutional doctrine. They write to aid the Court in
interpreting and applying the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. Amici are listed below:2 
Ronald J. Colombo
Professor of Law
Associate Dean for Distance Education
Maurice A. Deane School of Law
Hofstra University
Richard Epstein
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law
NYU School of Law
Peter and Kirstin Bedford Senior Fellow, Hoover
Institution
Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago
Carl H. Esbeck
R.B. Price Professor of Law Emeritus 
Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor Emeritus
University of Missouri
David F. Forte
Professor of Law
Cleveland State University
Cleveland Marshall College of Law
1 The parties filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus brief.
Neither a party nor its counsel authored this brief in whole or in
part. No person or entity, other than amici curiae or their counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation and submission
of this brief.
2 All institutional names given for identification purposes only.
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Robert P. George
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence
Princeton University
Mary Ann Glendon
Learned Hand Professor of Law
Harvard University
Bryan McCall
Orpha and Maurice Merrill Professor in Law
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Stacy Scaldo
Associate Professor of Law
Florida Coastal School of Law
Steven Smith
Warren Distinguished Professor of Law
Co-Executive Director, Institute for Law & Religion
Co-Executive Director, Institute for Law & Philosophy
University of San Diego School of Law
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Lurking behind the regulatory issues presented by
this appeal is a concerted effort to displace the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
(´QFQAµ), with a novel approach that would trivialize
] h]Z—V ^XW`aj kj Wahecekj. Sda CkXWW VdkXh` jkW
indulge it. 
,j ´]j aW] kb SaWY]VeYa ckYaWjiajW]h WacXh]Wekj,
defining the proper realm for free exercise can be 
`ebbe_XhW.µ Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682, 737 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring). To aid in this
determination, Congress enacted RFRA³a sensible
framework for balancing religious freedom and third-
party interests implicated by religious exemptions to
neutral, generally applicable laws. In so doing,
Congress restored the compelling interest test to
claims that a facially-neutral law of general
]SShe_]^eheW\ ´VX^VW]jWe]hh\ ^XW`ajVµ the free exercise 
of religion3³a test that had been abandoned by the 
Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990). Thus, RFRA creates a statutory exemption
from neutral and generally applicable laws that
substantially burden sincere religious beliefs unless
the government can establish its requirement meets
Wda a[]_Wejc ´VWWe_W V_WXWej\µ VW]j`]W`. O”Brvan v.
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003).
Time and again, this CkXWW d]V dah` Wd]W CkjcWaVV—V 
weighted balance in favor of religious freedom is 
constitutional. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 736; 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § ^^(^)() (´Sda SXWSkVaV kb WdeV _d]SWaW ]Wa
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
a[aW_eVa kb Wahecekj eV VX^VW]jWe]hh\ ^XW`aja`.µ).
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Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719²21 (2005). Some
kb QFQA—V _WeWe_V ej ]_]`aie], dkZaYaW, _kjWaj` Wda
Establishment Clause bans any religious exemption
Wd]W ´WaVXeWaV SakSha Wk ^a]W Wda ^XW`aj kb WahecekjV Wk
which they do not belong and whose teachings they do
jkW SW]_We_a.µ4 Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to
_d]W]_WaWe]a WdaVa _WeWe_V— SkVeWekj³like that of the
States challenging the Final Rules at issue here³as a
backdoor attempt to neutralize RFRA in all cases
involving abortion, contraception, and certain appli­
cations of anti-discrimination law.5 Yet nothing in
Smith prevents Congress from reinstating the accom­
4 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Euemmtions from the ¶Contracemtion
Mandate” 7hreaten Religious Liberty, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014).
See also Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, & Richard Schragger,
The Costs of Conscience, Public Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series 2018-14, University of Virginia Law School (Mar.
) (daWaej]bWaW ´Costs of Conscienceµ) Le_]d R_dZ]WW]i]jj,
Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Holt v. Hobbs and Third Party
Harms, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Jan. 22, 2015) https://balkin. 
blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-hobbs-and-third-party-harms.html;
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.²C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014);
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women:
Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the
Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC, 51 (2014).
5 QFQA—V `aWW]_WkWV d]Ya VXccaVWa` Wda Fej]h QXhaV (]j` Wda
Interim Final Rule before them) only accentuate the third-party
harms present within this exemption because the Rules
accommodate ´ikW]h ]V Zahh ]V WahecekXV _kjYe_WekjV.µ Raa Le_]d
Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, and Richard Schragger, The Costs
of Conscience and the Trump Contra-ception Rules, TAKE CARE
BLOG (Mar. 8, 2018) https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-costs-of­
conscience-and-the-trump-contraception-rules. But the proper
Establishment Clause remedy is to extend exemptions to
religious-like objections. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
351²61 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result).
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modation scheme that was widely respected in such
cases as Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1968) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Sda _WeWe_V— ]WcXiajW VXbbaWV bWki VaYaW]h
analytical defects that can be remedied by (1) a proper
_kjVWeWXWekj]h Xj`aWVW]j`ejc kb QFQA—V Wah]WekjVdeS Wk
the Establishment Clause; (2) an accurate understand­
ing of how the Religion Clauses safeguard third-party
interests; and (3) the correct application of these
understandings to the Final Rules.
First, RFRA incorporates Establishment Clause
limits on religious accommodations. It applies equally
to all religions ]j` W]gaV ejWk ]__kXjW Wda ckYaWjiajW—V 
interest in protecting third parties when that interest
is compelling. The critics object to RFRA on supposed
Establishment Clause grounds on the odd view that
government entitlements (rather than constitutional
proWa_WekjV) ]Wa Wda ´^]Vahejaµ kb WecdWV, aYaj WdkXcd
the Constitution gives that priority of place to the
rights of individuals to practice their religious faiths.
Sda\ ]hVk k^fa_W Wk Wda kVWajVe^ha ´VWWe_WjaVVµ kb QFQA—V
compelling state interest even though that too only
marks a return to the prior learning in both Sherbert
and Verner, which was well defended by Justice
Blackmun in his prescient dissent in Smith. See 494
U.S. 872, 909²10 (1990); see also Richard A. Epstein,
The Defeat of the Contraceptive Mandate in Hobby
Lobby: Right Result, Wrong Reason, CATO SUPREME
COURT REV. 35, 41²42 (2013 Term). Nor is there any
reason to dilute the protection afforded under RFRA
because a private party, and not the government, is 
making the protest. A uniform standard is the only way
to protect the statute from being gutted with a
succession of third party claims. 
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More fundamentally, arguing that RFRA should
not apply when abortion, contraception, or anti­
discrimination laws are at issue is a political argument
for the political branches. It is not an argument for
distorting Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which,
as this Court has _kjbeWia`, ´iXVW ^a ejWaWSWaWa` ^\
WabaWaj_a Wk deVWkWe_]h SW]_We_aV ]j` Xj`aWVW]j`ejcV.µ
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819
(2014) (internal quotations omitted). 
Second, ]hhkZejc Vaha_WeYa, ´Vecjebe_]jWµ (^XW jkW
compelling) third-party interests to trump RFRA
under the false flag of the Establishment Clause
misstates Religion Clause jurisprudence. This CouWW—V 
cases distinguish between religious exemptions, which
do not violate the Constitution, and religious
preferences, which may (though not always) violate the
Establishment Clause. Preferences entail State action;
exemptions do not.6 QFQA—V _WeWe_V chkVV over this 
distinction by re-characterizing landmark Supreme
Court decisions like Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) and Walz v. Tax 
Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), which defended exemptions from Social
Security contributions and the tax laws, respectively. 
Ignoring the distinction between exceptions and
SWabaWaj_aV ´_kXh` WXWj ]hh WacXh]WekjV ejWk ajWeWha­
ments to which nobody could object on religious
cWkXj`V.µ Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 n.37. Indeed,
this conflation could even threaten the longstanding,
widely embraced statutory practice of exempting
6 Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate
the Establishment Clause?, 106 KTY. L. J. 603, 616 and n.81 (2018)
(daWaej]bWaW ´Discretionary Religious Exemptionsµ).
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individuals and entities from being forced to provide or
pay for abortions.
Third, the argument for contriving an Establish­
ment Clause bypass around RFRA is an unprincipled
exercise in special pleading, which disregards the clear
eiSkWW kb Wda RXSWaia CkXWW—V `a_eVekjV ej Hobby
Lobby and Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per
curiam). Both cases indicated Wda ´Va]ihaVVµ _kYaW]ca 
of abortifacients and contraceptives is not a compelling
interest that justifies denying a religious exemption to 
the Little Sisters of the Poor similar to that already
given to some for-profit corporations, small businesses,
ajWeWeaV ZeWd ´cW]j`b]WdaWa`µ da]hWd-insurance plans,
and those religious organizations the federal government
has already deemed exempt. ´QFQA eV ej_kjVeVWajW ZeWd
the insistence of an agency such as HHS on distinguishing
between different religious believers³burdening one
while accommodating the other³when it may treat
^kWd aVX]hh\.µ Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
Final Rules resolved this under-inclusiveness. An
exemption that satisfies RFRA does not become
constitutionally suspect simply because the determined
kSSkjajWV kb QFQA `k ´jkW like the compelling interest
WaVW.µ7 
Congress did not exempt the Affordable Care Act
(´ACAµ) bWki QFQA, as it could have. At long last, HHS
has recognized and applied RFRA to the substantial
burden faced by the Little Sisters and other nonprofits. 
Sda abbkWWV kb Wda Oh]ejWebb RW]WaV ]j` QFQA—V _WeWe_V ej
academia to circumvent that framework in the name of
third-party interests is unmoored from the Constitution
7 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious
Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 251 (1995) 
(emphasis in original).
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]j` ZkXh` XSaj` kXW j]Wekj—V YajaW]ble tradition of
religious accommodation that Congress, through
RFRA, consciously sought to restore.
ARGUMENT
I.	 RFRA is a constitutionally acceptable,
legislative judgment about how to treat third-
party objections to religious exemptions.
When Congress enacted RFRA, it manifested the
´Vkhe_eWkXVjaVVµ Smith anticipated regarding the social
value of religious exercise and, at the same time, it
respected the primacy of the democratic process in
harmonizing religious exemptions with other social
values.8 QFQA eV _kjVeVWajW ZeWd WdeV j]Wekj—V hkjc
tradition of safeguarding religious exercise through
democratically-enacted exemptions. 
Even as some framers debated whether the
Constitution compelled certain religious exemptions,
´WdaWa eV YeWWX]hh\ no evidence that anyone thought
[regulatory exemptions] were constitutionally prohibit­
ed or that they were part of an establishment of
Wahecekj.µ9 Indeed, RFRA and the baseline of religious
bWaa`ki eW ajVXWaV bkhhkZ bWki Wda bkXj`aWV— SkheWe_]h
SdehkVkSd\, ^aVW ]WWe_Xh]Wa` ^\ I]iaV L]`eVkj ´,W eV
the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to
8 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment,
and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 44²45 
(2014); William K. Kelly, The Primacy of Political Actors in 
Accommodation of Religion, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 403 (2000).
9 Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior
and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1796 (2006) (emphasis added).
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him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.µ10 
QFQA—V VWWX_WXWa d]Wikje]aV Wda WecdW kb bWaa
exercise and other compelling interests. It supersedes
all prior, inconsistent federal law; it presumptively
applies to all future federal law; and it applies to the 
implementation of federal law (like the HHS mandate
and the Final Rules).11 If Congress does not want
RFRA to apply to a given statute (whether out of a
concern for a third-S]WW\—V ejWaWaVW kW bkW kWdaW
Wa]VkjV), eW _]j a[aiSW Wd]W VW]WXWa bWki QFQA—V
grasp.12 Even as it stands, RFRA only protects religious 
a[aW_eVa Zdaj Wda a[aW_eVa eV ´VX^VW]jWe]hh\µ burdened
by government action. Even then, the government may
substantially burden religious exercise only when its
action, applied to the person, ´(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling
ckYaWjiajW]h ejWaWaVW.µ13 
Rather than resolve every conceivable conflict
between religious claims and other values, Congress
tasked the judiciary with applying³not distorting³ 
QFQA—V bW]iaZkWg to particular cases. This Court has
_kjVeVWajWh\ ´reaffirmed . . . the feasibility of case-by­
10 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments (1785), reprinted in 8 The Papers of James Madison
1784²86, at 295 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (emphasis
added); see also Kevin Seamus Hasson, Framing a Nation Under
God: The Political Philosophy of the Founders in BELIEVERS,
THINKERS, AND FOUNDERS: HOW WE CAME TO BE ONE NATION
UNDER GOD 115²29 (2016).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)-(b).
12 Id. at § 2000bb-3(b).
13 Id. at §§ 2000bb(b), 2000bb-1(a) & (b).
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case consideration of religious exemptions to generally
]SShe_]^ha WXhaV.µ Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436²37
(2006). Despite the claims of some critics that the
Establishment Clause, ex ante, takes this harmonizing
off the table here in light of Cutter, 14 ´WjYkWdejc ej
[CutterY VXccaVWa` Wd]W _kXWWV ZaWa jkW XS Wk Wda W]Vgµ
of the balancing. Id. Because RFRA does not embody
an unyielding preference for religious exercise over any
other public or private interest and because it both
avoids denominational favoritism and gives adequate 
protection for third-S]WW\ ejWaWaVWV, QFQA—V bW]iaZkWg
does not violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719²20 (holding so in the context of
the RLUIPA, which possesses the same framework as 
RFRA).
EYaj QFQA—V _WeWe_V, Zdk XWca ] ^]j kj WahecekXV
a[aiSWekjV Wd]W ]hhaca`h\ _]XVa ´VX^VW]jWe]hµ WdeW`­
S]WW\ d]WiV, _kj_a`a Wd]W ´QFQA VaaiV facially to 
comply with the EsW]^heVdiajW Ch]XVa.µ15 Notably, in
their recent article, Costs of Conscience, Professors
Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger avoid casting any
explicit constitutional doubt on RFRA. Instead, they
Vaag Wk Xj`aWieja Wda ZeV`ki kb CkjcWaVV—V `a_eVekj
to address third-S]WW\ d]WiV WdWkXcd QFQA—V ]j]h\VeV
of a compelling interest pursued through the least-
restrictive means.16 OXWWejc ]Ve`a Wda b]_W Wd]W ´Wda
wisdom kb CkjcWaVV—V fX`ciajWµ ej aVW]^heVdejc QFQA
´eV jkW W] fX`e_e]hY _kj_aWj,µ Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 736
(aiSd]VeV ]``a`), Wda _WeWe_V— k^fa_WekjV Wk _kjVe`aWejc
14 See Costs of Conscience at 12.
15 Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contra­
ception Mandate, 49 HARV. C.R. ² C.L. L. REV. at 348.

16 See, e.g., Costs of Conscience at 17²19.
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third-party interests within the RFRA framework do 
not give rise to an Establishment Clause violation.17 
A.	 7he mromer ´baselineµ of rights is religious
liberty, not government benefits.
Sda beWVW k^fa_Wekj QFQA—V ]_]`aie_ _WeWe_V i]ga Wk 
QFQA—V ]hhaca` abba_W kj WdeW`-party interests is that
´WacXh]WkW\ ^]VahejaVµ Wd]W e`ajWeb\ Wda ´ajWeWhaiajWVµ
owed to particular third-parties (e.g., the alleged
´ajWeWhaWiajWY to insurance coverage for all forms of
_kjWW]_aSWekj ]SSWkYa` ^\ Wda FDAµ) jaa` Wk ^a
established before religious exemptions can be 
considered, not after.18 
This objection has no place under the 
EVW]^heVdiajW Ch]XVa. ´WFYkW Wda iaj Zdk ZWkWa Wda 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the 
¶aVW]^heVdiajW— kb ] Wahecekj _kjjkWa` VSkjVkWVdeS,
financial support, and active involvement of the 
VkYaWaecj ej WahecekXV ]_WeYeW\.µ Walz, 397 U.S. at 668;
see also Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819 (confirming
Wda EVW]^heVdiajW Ch]XVa ´iXVW ^a interpreted by
WabaWaj_a Wk deVWkWe_]h SW]_We_aV ]j` Xj`aWVW]j`ejcVµ)
17 QFQA—V _kjVe`aW]Wekj kb WdeW`-party harms as a facet of the
compelling-interest analysis is commonplace in constitutional
law. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
T.R. ,  () (a[Sh]ejejc Wda ´bXj`]iajW]h k^fa_Wµ kb
banning race discrimi-j]Wekj ej SX^he_ ]__kiik`]WekjV ´Z]V Wk
vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
]__kiS]jeaV `aje]hV kb aVX]h ]__aVV Wk SX^he_ aVW]^heVdiajWVµ) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 625 (1984) (the compelling
ejWaWaVW ej ´aW]`e_]Wejc `eV_Weiej]Wekj ]c]ejVW eWV bai]ha _eWe]ajVµ
a[eVWV ^a_]XVa Va[ `eV_Weiej]Wekj ´^kWd `aSWeYaV SaWVkjV kb WdaeW
individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
S]WWe_eS]Wekj ej SkheWe_]h, a_kjkie_, ]j` _XhWXW]h heba.µ).
18 See, e.g., Costs of Conscience at 14²19.
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A__kW`ejch\, ´aVW]^heVdejcµ Wahecekj WaVXeWaV some form
of government action:
[T]he government does not establish
religion by leaving it alone. . . . In the case
of a religious exemption, the government
has never altered the status quo ante. . . .
With an exemption, the Court does not
deny that third parties may have suffered
a harm. Rather, the Court is saying that
if there was such incidental harm, it was
not caused by the government.19 
Because the Establishment Clause is not implicated in
the absence of State action,20 it is incoherent to suggest
Wda Ch]XVa SWkWa_WV ´WacXh]WkW\ ^]VahejaVµ21 when a
religious claimant seeks to restore the pre-regulation
status quo. Indeed, the chronology of the exemption
protected by the Final Rules here proves the point: the 
ACA promised, via HHS regulation, a new government
entitlement to contraception and abortifacients that
overrode previously-protected religious liberty. RFRA
only evaluates the propriety of returning the religious
claimant to the prior baseline. This approach is
_kjVeVWajW ZeWd L]`eVkj—V Xj`aWVW]j`ejc kb WahecekXV
WecdWV ]j` `XWeaV ]V ´SWa_a`ajW, ^kWd ej kW`aW kb Weia
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Rk_eaW\.µ22 
19 Discretionary Religious Exemptions at 623²24. 
20 Id. at 616 and n.81.
21 Cf. Costs of Conscience at 17.
22 See supra n.10; see also Ronald J. Colombo, An Antitrust
Approach to Corporate Free Exercise Claims, 91 ST. JOHN—S L. REV.
,  j. () (´,W eV kjh\ ^a_]XVa kb ckYaWjiajW—V ejWaWbaWaj_a
. . . Wd]W Wda _kjbhe_W ^aWZaaj WecdWV aYaj ]WeVaV.µ). Cb. Hobby
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This Court illustrated in Amos how religious liberty
serves as the proper baseline for evaluating govern­
ment entitlements. There, the Court rejected an as­
]SShea` EVW]^heVdiajW Ch]XVa _d]hhajca Wk SeWha U,,—V
exeiSWekj kb WahecekXV aiShk\aWV bWki Wda VW]WXWa—V
general prohibition of religious discrimination. See 483
U.S. at 329²30. This exemption allowed the religious
employer in Amos to terminate a building custodian
based on his religion³a clear third-party harm, but
one this Court nevertheless found insufficient to 
kYaWWe`a Wda VW]WXWa—V WahecekXV a[aiSWekj. Kega QFQA, 
Wda SXWSkVa kb SeWha U,,—V WahecekXV a[aiSWekj eV Wk 
´hebWWY ] Wegulation that burdens the exercise of
Wahecekj.µ Id. at 338.
Amos further explained that this purpose is distinct
from an advancement of religion that might violate the 
EVW]^heVdiajW Ch]XVa. Tjhega VW]WXWaV Wd]W ´`ahac]WaWY
governmental power to religious employers and
convey[] a message of governmental endorsement of
WahecekXV `eV_Weiej]Wekj,µ id. at 337 n.15 (internal
VXkW]Wekj i]WgV ]j` _eW]Wekj kieWWa`), SeWha U,,—V
VW]WXWkW\ WahecekXV a[aiSWekj WaVWkWaV Wda ´^]Vahejaµ kb
rights the religious claimant and the third-party
respectively possessed before the government imposed
Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 j. (´++R ]SSa]WV Wk i]ejW]ej Wd]W ]
plaintiff cannot prevail on a RFRA claim that seeks an exemption
from a legal obligation requiring the plaintiff to confer benefits on
third parties. Nothing in the text of RFRA or its basic purposes
supports giving the Government an entirely free hand to impose
burdens on religious exercise so long as those burdens confer a
benefit on other individuals. . . . [I]t could not reasonably be
maintained that any burden on religious exercise, no matter how
onerous and no matter how readily the government interest could
be achieved through alternative means, is permissible under
RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation requires the
WahecekXV ]`daWajW Wk _kjbaW ] ^ajabeW kj WdeW` S]WWeaV.µ).
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its regulation. No government action occurs when a
private party takes action involving a third-party. See
id. (´Tj`kX^Wa`h\, Wda WWdeW`-S]WW\—VY bWaa`ki of choice
in religious matters was impinged upon, but it was the 
Church . . . and not the Government, who put him to
the choice of changing his religious practices or losing
deV fk^.µ).
IXVW ]V SeWha U,,—V SWkde^eWekjV _]jjkW ^a _kjVe`aWa`
without its provision for religious exemptions, the ACA
cannot be evaluated without looking at RFRA. By its
own terms, RFRA applies to any subsequent federal
statute³and administrative implementation of that
statute³unless Congress expressly says otherwise.
CkjcWaVV `e` jkW `k Wd]W daWa, ]j` QFQA—V
ij_kWSkW]Wekj ejWk Wda ACA ajVXWaV Wda ´^]Vahejaµ
protection of religious liberty is not disturbed by the
ACA. Like the Title VII exemption in Amos, RFRA
merely lifts, in certain circumstances, a government-
imposed burden on religion. Restoring that pre-burden
^]Vaheja ` kaV jkW ´WaVXeWa Wd]W Wda WWahecekXVY a[aiSWekj
_kia S]_g]ca` ZeWd ^ajabeWV Wk Va_Xh]W ajWeWeaV.µ Id. at
338; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)
(upholding the Hyde Amendment and concluding the
government was under no obligatikj Wk ´WaikYa WdkVa
[obstacles to a right, there, the right to abortion] not of
eWV kZj _Wa]Wekjµ). IXVW Vk daWa WaikYejc Wda ^XW`aj kb
the HHS mandate does not violate the Establishment
Clause. See id. at 317 (the statutory religious exemption
at issue, as here, left WdeW` S]WWeaV ZeWd ´Wda V]ia W]jca
of [insurance] choice[s] . . . as [they] would have had if
Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at
]hh.µ).
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B. Complaining that the compelling interest test is
´too stringentµ to account for third-party 
interests has no basis in this Court”s
jurisprudence.
The second k^fa_Wekj W]eVa` ^\ QFQA—V `aWW]_WkWV eV
Wd]W CkjcWaVV—s choice to account for third-party harms
within the compelling-interest test imposes an analysis
Wd]W ´eV Wkk VWWejcajW ]j` ]hVk ej_kjVeVWajW ZeWd
SWa_a`ajW.µ23 Sda RXSWaia CkXWW—V _]VaV VXSSkWW jk 
such contention. 
Sda _WeWe_V— ]WcXiajW WaheaV kj ] ieVWa]`ejc kb
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703
(1985),24 which invalidated a religious preference on
Establishment Clause grounds; specifically, a
Ckjja_We_XW VW]WXWa Wd]W ´SaWieWWa` aiShk\aaV who
observe a Sabbath to demand that their employer
]__kiik`]Wa Wda aiShk\aa—V WahecekXV SW]_We_a.µ25 All
that the critics of the compelling-interest test claim is 
Wd]W ´WeYW VaaiV eiSWk^]^ha Wd]W Wda VW]Wa d]` ]
_kiSahhejc ejWaWaVWµ ej Caldor.26 That misses the point.
Caldor involved a religious preference, not a religious
exemption. Moreover, an Establishment Clause
violation was found because the government entered a
wholly private dispute and took the side of the religious 
_h]ei]jW ^\ eiSkVejc ]j ´unyielding weighting in
b]YkW kb R]^^]Wd k^VaWYaWV kYaW ]hh kWdaW ejWaWaVWV.µ
472 U.S. at 709²10 (emphasis added). The balancing
inherent to RFRA makes it improper to characterize 
23 Costs of Conscience at 18.
24 Id.
25 Discretionary Religious Exemptions at 606; see also id. at 613² 
16 (analyzing Caldor).
26 Costs of Conscience at 18.
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Wda Fej]h QXhaV ]V a[de^eWejc ]j ´Xj\eah`ejcµ WahecekXV
preferences. 
More importantly, this Court has never held that
significant third-party harms that fall short of a
compelling state interest are strong enough to 
overcome a substantial religious burden. Rather, this
Court will uphold religious exemptions even when the
government has a compelling interest if the
government has not pursued that interest through the
means least-restrictive to religious liberty. See, e.g.,
Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864²65. Hobby Lobby explained the
consequences of bypassing the compelling-interest test
simply because a third-party claim finds it too hard to 
satisfy. See 573 U.S. at 729 j. (´B\ bW]iejc ]j\
Government regulation as benefiting a third party, the 
Government could turn all regulations into 
entitlements to which nobody could object on religious
groXj`V, Waj`aWejc QFQA ia]jejchaVV.µ). Sk ^a VXWa, 
´WdaWa i]\ ^a ejVW]j_aV ej Zde_d ] jaa` bkW XjebkWieW\
precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally
]SShe_]^ha h]ZV Xj`aW QFQA.µ O Centro, 546 U.S. at
. BXW jk VX_d ´ejVW]j_aµ a[eVWV daWa.
When, as here, the religious exemption at issue is 
kb ] ´hkjcVW]j`ejcµ W\Sa, Wda VkWW kb a[aiSWekj Wd]W ha`
Congress to enact RFRA, and Zdaj ´Wda Government
has not offered evidence demonstrating that granting .
. . an exemption would cause the kind of . . . harm
recognized as a compelling interest,µ id. at 437
(aiSd]VeV ]``a`), ]j ´ejVW]j_a ej Zde_d ] jaa` bkW
uniformity precludes the recognition of [RFRA]
a[aiSWekjVµ `kaV jkW a[eVW, see id. ]W . QFQA—V
critics do not contradict these provisos from O Centro, 
and tellingly so. As this language confirms, whenever
the Supreme Court faces a claim that some lesser
ejWaWaVW iecdW WaVXeWa ´XjebkWiµ ]SShe_]Wekj kb ]
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general law, RFRA notwithstanding, the Court still
insists that any challengers demonstrate a compelling
state interest. Constitutional law simply provides no
basis to skirt that test.27 
Here, the exemption provided by the Final Rules
simply gives to the objecting nonprofits the same, pre­
existing exemption afforded to churches and their
integrated auxiliaries.28 This exemption is the raison
d”etre of RFRA. See The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102 CONG. REC. 192 (1992) (statement of
M]`eja RWWkVVaj) (´In the after-math of the Smith
decision, it was easy to imagine how religious practices
and institutions would have to abandon their beliefs in
order to comply with generally applicable, neutral
laws. At risk were such familiar practices as . . .
permitting religiously sponsored hospitals to decline to 
SWkYe`a ]^kWWekj kW _kjWW]_aSWekj VaWYe_aV.µ) 
CONG. REC. 9685 (1993) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
(a[Sh]ejejc Wd]W QFQA eV ´]j kSSkWWXjeW\ Wk _kWWa_W . . . 
ejfXVWe_aWVYµ hega ] ´C]tholic teaching hospital [that]
lost its accreditation for refusing to provide abortion
VaWYe_aVµ). Aj` bej]hh\, ]V Wda _WeWe_V ]hh ^XW _kj_a`a ej
complaining that the compelling-interest test is too
´VWWejcajWµ Wk V]WeVb\, WdaWa d]V ^aaj jk showing that
´Va]ihaVVµ ejVXW]j_a _kYaW]ca kb abortifacients and
27 Indeed, even United States v. Lee, Zde_d QFQA—V _WeWe_V Wah\ kj
in support of the argument that regulatory entitlements should be
understood to precede religious liberty, applied³as the critics
concede³the compelling interest analysis. Costs of Conscience at
16 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 258). Moreover, Hobby Lobby
distinguished Lee from the situation here. Discretionary Religious
Exemptions at 621 n.123.
28 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contracep-tion Mandate, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 380²81.
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contraceptives is a compelling interest pursued through
the means least-restrictive on religious exercise.
Skipping over the compelling-ejWaWaVW VWaS cXWV QFQA—V
carefully calibrated three-stage framework.
C.	 An Establishment Clause claim requires State
action.
Sda bej]h k^fa_Wekj QFQA—V _WeWe_V i]ga Wk 
considering third-party harms within the RFRA
bW]iaZkWg eV Wd]W ´Wda government will not always be
Wda S]WW\ k^fa_Wejc Wk ] WahecekXV a[aiSWekj.µ29 The
critics cite this very litigation as proof positive, claiming
Wd]W ´WWYda ejWaWaVW kb WdkVa ^XW`aja` ^\ ] WahecekXV
accommodation need not coincide with the
ckYaWjiajW—V ejWarests, whether or not compelling, to
warrant protection under the Establishment Clause.
After all, the Establishment Clause protects the
religious freedom of private individuals, not only state
]_WkWV.µ30 Establishment Clause jurisprudence rejects 
this argument.31 
QFQA—V `aWW]_WkWV Vaag Wk ^XWWWaVV WdaeW ]WcXiajW
by pointing to Caldor, Zde_d ´Z]V ^WkXcdW ^\ SWeY]Wa 
aiShk\aWV,µ and in which, the critics claim, the private 
aiShk\aWV ´`e` jkW jaa` Wk ]hhaca Wd]W WdaeW ejWaWaVWV 
were compelling for government purposes, only that
they were significantly burdened as a result of the
29 Costs of Conscience at 18.
30 Id.
31 Moreover, the division between third-party harms and societal
ejWaWaVWV eV ]WWebe_e]h. ´WNYja iecdW VeiSh\ V]\ Wd]W _kiSahhejc
state interests just exactly are third party interests of adequate 
gravity. Whose interests is the government protecting in resisting
] WahecekXV ]__kiik`]Wekj eb jkW WdkVa kb WdeW` S]WWeaV?µ L]W_ N.
DeGirolami, Free Exercise By Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
105, 133 (2016).
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ckYaWjiajW—V WahecekXV ]__kiik`]Wekj.µ32 These
contentions are non sequiturs. AhWdkXcd ´Wda
commercial burden on Caldor Stores gave it standing
to raise the Establishment Clause defense[,] it was the
statute requiring private parties to assist Thornton in
his religious duties that crossed the boundary between
church and state, thus violating the Establishment
Ch]XVa.µ33 Unlike here, where the Final Rules lift a 
burden imposed on religious exercise by the HHS
i]j`]Wa SXWVX]jW Wk Wda ACA, SdkWjWkj Z]V ´]_WeYah\
aiSkZaWa`µ ^\ Wda Ckjja_We_XW VW]WXWa ´Wk `ai]j` Wda 
assistance of private parties to secure the observance
kb deV R]^^]Wd. Sd]W eV ¶VW]Wa ]_Wekj.—µ34 
The Amos Court distinguished Caldor in the same 
way, noting that, in Caldor, ´Ckjja_We_XW d]` given the
force of law Wk Wda aiShk\aa—V `aVecj]Wekj kb ] R]^^]Wd
day and required accommodation by the employer
regardless of the burden which that constituted for the
aiShk\aW kW kWdaW aiShk\aaV.µ Amos, 483 U.S. at 337
n.15 (emphasis added). In Amos, there was no State 
action; the harm to the janitor was caused by his own
church. Id. In Caldor, there was State action; the harm
to the department store was caused by the Connecticut
statute. The Establishment Clause (indeed, the entire
Bill of Rights) is not there to protect private parties
from other private parties. It is there to protect private
parties from the Government. 
This CkXWW—V `a_eVekj ej Walz reinforces Amos—V
distinction between a religious exemption and a
religious preference. By a vote of 8 to 1, the Court held
32 Costs of Conscience at 18.
 
33 Discretionary Religious Exemptions at 614 (emphasis added).

34 Id. at 615.
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Wd]W ] iXje_eS]heW\—V SWkSaWW\ W][ a[aiSWekj bkW
houses of worship did not violate the Establishment
Ch]XVa ^a_]XVa cW]jWejc ]j a[aiSWekj ´eV VeiSh\
sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of
SWkSaWW\ W][]Wekj haYea` kj WkWdaWVY.µ Walz, 397 U.S. at
673. Had the municipality in Walz enacted a
SWabaWaj_a, eW ZkXh` d]Ya ´WW]jVbaWWWa`Y S]WW kb eWV 
WaYajXa Wk _dXW_daV.µ Id. ]W . ,jVWa]`, eW ´VeiSh\
abstain[ed] from demanding that the church support
Wda VW]Wa.µ Id. There is no basis to claim that an
Establishment Clause violation exists when the
government is not taking some action to affirmatively
advance religion. 
´AV we have said before, our cases will not tolerate 
the imposition of Fourteenth Amendment restraints on
private action by the simple device of characterizing
Wda RW]Wa—V ej]_Wekj ]V ]XWdkWe]]Wekj kW aj_kXW]ca­
iajW.µ Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,
54 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The same is true when federal action is at
issue, and the RFRA critics who oppose the Final
QXhaV— WahecekXV a[aiSWekj kbbaW jk ^]VeV Wk
revolutionize constitutional law by applying its
restraints to private conduct. 
Ultimately, the crite_V— k^fa_WekjV Wk Wda ]SShe_]Wekj
of RFRA boil down to this: They³and the States that
echo their third-party harm arguments³disagree with
the way Congress chose to account for religious 
interests relative to other competing social values.
Overturning religious exemptions would result in ´]
much larger role for government in the lives of
religious people and organizations, thereby shrinking
that part of civil society for church-state separation
and the desired religious self-governance. Whether
such an expansion is good or bad is not the issue here.
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Rather, the question is who has the authority to make 
Wd]W `a_eVekj ]j` dkZ eW eV i]`a.µ35 As Professor
Aha[]j`aW Be_gah SXW eW, ´^\ WecdW, Wda e`a] kb SWkcWaVV
eV _kiikj SWkSaWW\µ eW eV jkW Wda fX`e_e]W\—V Wk ` afine.36 
No argument consistent with the historical practices 
and traditions protected by the Establishment Clause
has been made to authorize this Court to undermine
the congressional judgment RFRA embodies.
II.	 There is no constitutional basis to argue that
discretionary religious exemptions violate the
Cnmrshstshnm rhlokx bHcatrH nI ôrhfmhIhcamsµ
third-party interests.
Conscious of the insurmountable challenges to
upending RFRA via the Establishment Clause, the
critics kSSkVejc Wda KeWWha ReVWaWV— d]W`-won exemption
seek to reinterpret the Religion Clauses more
generally. According to their novel, revisionist view,
this Court has supposedly ´a[She_eWh\ ]j` WaSa]Wa`h\
Wa_kcje]a`µ Wd]W VX^VW]jWe]h³not compelling³third­
party harms give rise to Establishment Clause limits 
on religious exemptions.37 MkW Vk. Sda ´CkXWW d]V hkjc
recognized that the government may (and sometimes
must) accommodate religious practices and that it may
do so without violating the Establishment Clause.µ
Hobbie v. Unemmlovment Ammeals Comm”n, 480 U.S.
136, 144²45 (1987). 
Hosanna-Tabor, for example, held that the First
Aiaj`iajW—V ´iejeVWaWe]h a[_aSWekjµ Wk ba`aW]h ]jWe­
discrimination statutes barred a retaliation claim from
35 Discretionary Religious Exemptions at 624. 
36 Alexander M. Bickel, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
 
PROGRESS 181 (1978).

37 See Costs of Conscience at 7.
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a fourth-grade teacher at a Lutheran school. Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 195²96 (2012). There is no 
doubt that a discrete and significant third-party harm
was present in Hosanna-Tabor: the only reason the 
employee there could not sue her employer for violating
Wda AiaWe_]jV SeWd DeV]^eheWeaV A_W—V retaliation
prohibition was because her employer was a religious
kWc]je]]Wekj ]j` Vda VX]hebea` ]V ] ´iejeVWaW.µ But
wdeha ´WWYda ejWaWaVW kb Vk_eaW\ ej Wda ajbkW_aiajW kb
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly
important[, . . .] so too is the interest of religious groups
in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their
b]eWd, ]j` _]WW\ kXW WdaeW ieVVekj.µ Id. at 196. Like in
RFRA, the Court confirmed that the ministerial
exceSWekj _]j ^a ]SShea` ´Wk kWdaW _eW_XiVW]j_aV.µ See
id. No part of Hosanna-Tabor suggests that the mere 
presence of substantial third-party harm acts to defeat
WahecekXV a[aiSWekjV, ]j` QFQA—V `aWW]_WkWV VaW bkWWd
no framework for balancing substantial third-party
harms against religious burdens in particular cases.38 
38 The critics opposing the RFRA framework purport to distinguish
Hosanna-Tabor (and Amos) from the handling of third-party
d]WiV ej kWdaW _]VaV ^a_]XVa Wda\ WaVW kj ´SkZaWbXh bWaa a[aW_eVa
and associational interests that generate a range of statutory and
constitutional protections ]c]ejVW he]^eheW\µ Wd]W, ]SS]WajWh\, kjh\
´WahecekXV kWc]je]]WekjVµ ajjoy. See Costs of Conscience at 13. This
distinction is contrived. Hosanna-Tabor never even mentions
Amos³a strong indication that the Court has not adopted the
_WeWe_V— j]WWkZ Wa]`ejc kb WdaVa WZk _]VaV. ,j`aa`, Zdeha Wda
ministerial exception certainly gX]W`V ]c]ejVW ´ckYaWjiajW
interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith
]j` ieVVekj kb Wda _dXW_d eWVahb,µ Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 n.2 (2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) (explaining Hosanna-
Tabor), that only speaks to the substantial burden such
government action imposes upon religion. This distinction does not
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Further, Amos, Walz, and other cases39 demonstrate
a distinction between a religious exemption that lifts a
government-imposed burden on religious exercise, and
a statutory religious preference. 40 This distinction not
only explains how, as discussed above, Amos
harmonized its holding with Caldor, see 483 U.S. at
337 n.15³it explains the myriad, long-accepted ways
ej Zde_d CkjcWaVV ]j` Wda fX`e_e]W\ d]Ya ´hebWWa`Y WY
WacXh]WekjWVYµ Wd]W ^XW`aj bWaa exercise without any
constitutional infirmities, see id. at 338. Indeed, there
is not a single case in which this Court has ever
overturned a religious exemption on Establishment
Clause grounds.41 
Other longstanding examples of accepted religious
exemptions where third-parties experience harm
abound. For example, 170,000 Vietnam War draftees
received conscientious objector deferments, even as the
selective service exemption for these objectors was
b]_e]hh\ heieWa` Wk WdkVa ZeWd ] ^aheab ej ] ´RXSWaia
at all suggest that religious liberty rights turn upon whether the
_h]ei]jW ]W eVVXa eV ] ´WahecekXV kWc]je]]Wekjµ (dkZaYaW Wd]W SdW]Va
is defined). See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706²17 (survey-ing
the U.S. Code and pre-Smith free-exercise jurisprudence and
finding no principled basis to conclude that for-profit corporations
cannot have their religious exercise substantially burdened within
the meaning of RFRA).
39 Discretionary Religious Exemptions at 609²10 (´,j ]``eWekj Wk 
Amos, the Court has on six other plenary reviews turned back an
Establish-ment Clause challenge to a discretionary religious
exemption) (citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720; Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-60 (1971); Walz, 397 U.S. at 673²75;
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308²15 (1952); Aver v. United 
States, 245 U.S. 366, 374 (1918); Goldman v. United States, 245
U.S. 474, 476 (1918)).
 
40 See Discretionary Religious Exemptions at 613²18. 

41 Id. at 613.
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Baejcµ ]j` aYaj WdkXcd Wda cW]jWejc kb ]j a[aiSWekj
sent a third-S]WW\ Wk Z]W ej Wda k^fa_WkW—V Sh]_a.42 
Indeed, the structure of conscientious objections in
Vietnam made it possible to determine affected third­
parties.43 Such objections date back to the American
Revolution. At no point have such objections been
thought to violate the Establishment Clause. 
Another example is the priest-penitent privilege.
This privilege is recognized throughout the United
RW]WaV ]j` ´WjYaeWdaW V_dkh]WV jkW _kXWWV VXaVWekj Wda
legitimacy of the privilege, and attorneys rarely litigate
Wda eVVXa,µ aYaj ]V Wda SWeYehaca eiSkVaV an obstacle on
a third-S]WW\—V Va]W_d bkW WWXWd. Mockaitis v.
Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532 (9th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Perhaps the most pervasive example³and most
relevant here³of religious exemptions are the 
´V\VWematic and all-aj_kiS]VVejcµ a[aiSWekjV bkW
individuals that decline to participate in abortions. 44 
These widespread exemptions have never been held
outside the realm of legislative authority simply
because access to a constitutional right is at issue.
Indeed, as Senator Ted Kennedy explained when
advocating for the Church Amendment, which ensured
that certain federal-fund recipients were not obliged to 
42 See James W. Tollefson, THE STRENGTH NOT TO FIGHT: AN ORAL 
HISTORY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 7 
(1993).
43 See William P. Marshall, Third-Party Burdens and Conscien­
tious Objection to War, 106 KTY. L. J. 661 (2018).
44 See Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not To Kill, 62
EMORY L.J. 121, 147² () (´WUYeWWX]hh\ aYaW\ VW]Wa ej Wda
country has some sort of statute protecting individuals and, in
i]j\ _]VaV, ajWeWeaV Zdk WabXVa Wk SWkYe`a ]^kWWekjV.µ).
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provide abortions and could not discriminate against
employees who would not participate in abortions:
´Congress has the authority under the Constitution to
exempt individuals from any requirement that they
perform medical procedures that are objectionable to
their religious convictions.µ 119 CONG. REC. 9602 (1973)
(aiSd]VeV ]``a`). K]_gejc ´seamlesVµ ]__aVV Wo abortion
because of religious exemptions does not constitute 
constitutionally-cognizable, third-party harm.
In short, devising a new constitutional doctrine
grounded ej ´VX^VW]jWe]hµ WdeW`-party harms would
require taking an eraser to well-established religious
exemptions. Without any principled framework to sort
out why cases involving abortion, contraception, and
]jWe`eV_Weiej]Wekj h]ZV ejYkhYa ´VX^VW]jWe]hµ WdeW`­
party harms but, for example, military draft
exemptions and the priest-penitent privilege do not.
Any such a test invites unneeded judicial speculation
]^kXW ´Wda Vk_e]h eiSkWW]j_a kb ]hh h]ZVµ Wd]W Wda
Supreme Court sought to avoid in Smith. See 494 U.S.
at 890.
III.	 The asserted third-party harm cannot
constitute a compelling government interest.
This Court must not consider third-party harms 
abstractly, wholly divorced from the burden they
impose on the religious claimant. Rather, this Court
iXVW ´¶V_WXWej]WaY Wda ]VVaWWa` d]Wi kb cW]jWejc
VSa_ebe_ a[aiSWekjV Wk S]WWe_Xh]W WahecekXV _h]ei]jWV,—
]j` ¶hkkg Wk Wda i]Wcej]h ejWaWaVW ej ajbkW_ejc— Wda
challenged government action in that particular
_kjWa[W.µ Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 
573 U.S. at 726²27). As Professor Michael Stokes
O]XhVaj d]V k^VaWYa`, ´Wda WaVW eV ]j a[WWaiah\
rigorous one, referring to an extremely narrow range
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of permissible justifications for infringements on
religious liberty. Not every legitimate, or even very
eiSkWW]jW, ejWaWaVW kb ckYaWjiajW VX]hebeaV.µ45 
By granting the Little Sisters and the other non-
profits an exemption similar to that already received by
churches, for-SWkbeW _kWSkW]WekjV, ´cW]j`b]WdaWa`µ da]hWd
insurance plans, and small businesses, women working
for the Little Sisters are simply restored to the pre-ACA
baseline of rights (as were those women who worked for
exempted for-profit corporations after Hobby Lobby, see
573 U.S. at 732²33). What the Court found acceptable
in the face of Establishment Clause challenges in the
Hyde Amendment context, see Harris, 448 U.S. at 315² 
17, and in the Title VII context, see Amos, 483 U.S. at
337 n.15, holds true here. 
Without the Final Rules, objecting nonprofits
remain singled out for disparate treatment compared
to those many other entities that receive an exemption
from the coverage mandate. By virtue of the
exemptions offered to churches and other entities and
businesses, Congress and HHS have already
`aWaWieja` Wd]W ´Va]ihaVVµ ]__aVs to abortifacients 
and contraceptives should be unavailable to tens of
millions of Americans. Denying the same exemption to 
the Little Sisters and the other objecting nonprofits, 
while citing the same regulatory interest Congress and
HHS has already decided not to apply to many others,
dooms a strict scrutiny defense. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 547 (1993) (explaining the government must avoid
free-exercise invalidity in regulating by not letting
45 Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It, 56 MONT. L. REV. at 263
(discussing and citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
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under-incluseYajaVV `k ´]SSWa_e]^ha `]i]ca Wk WWdaY
VXSSkVa`h\ YeW]h ejWaWaVW SWkde^eWa`µ). Sda Fej]h QXhaV
correct this untenable discrimination.
´QFQA eV ej_kjVeVWajW ZeWd Wda ejVeVWaj_a kb ]j
agency such as HHS on distinguishing between
different religious believers³burdening one while
accommodating the other³when it may treat both
aVX]hh\.µ Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 738 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The third-party harms doctrine proposed
^\ QFQA—V _WeWe_V ZkXh` WkhaW]Wa WdeV ej_kjVeVWaj_\. Sda
Court should reject this end-run around RFRA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully
request this Court WaYaWVa Wda hkZaW _kXWWV— WXhejcV.
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